According to both traditional positivist approaches and also to the sociology of scientific knowledge, social analysts should not themselves become involved in the controversies they are investigating. But 
This positivist approach, a &dquo;sociology of scientific error,&dquo; has been challenged by relativist analysts of science. In the strong program in the sociology of scientific knowledge, the analyst is enjoined to treat competing truth claims symmetrically (Bloor 1976 ). Instead of looking only at the side considered wrong by scientific authorities, the knowledge claims on both sides of the controversy are examined, and an attempt is made to explain them using social categories.2 The relativist program differs from the traditional approach in two major, related ways. First, the social analysis is applied to scientific knowledge claims, as well as to wider social dynamics. Second, both sides in the controversy are examined using the same repertoire of conceptual tools. This contrasts with the traditional approach, in which scientific knowledge claims are seldom scrutinized (that task is left to the scientists), and social explanations are selectively applied to the side without authoritative scientific backing. It should be noted that relativism is a set of methodological specifications. Relativists may (or may not) believe that there is an underlying scientific truth. But for the purposes of social analysis, they set the issue of truth and falsity aside: it is not treated as relevant to the social investigation.
Under both positivist and relativist approaches, the controversy is normally treated as something external to the researcher. It is &dquo;out there&dquo;: the social research itself is not viewed as part of the controversy. It is this pervasive assumption that we question in this article.
Within the traditional positivist interpretation of science, the role of researchers in relation to scientific controversies appears to raise few methodological problems. The conventional view is that social researchers should be objective in their assessment of social evidence. This usually implies that the social researcher is not directly involved in the issue being studied. However, because positivists treat scientific knowledge as different from other sorts of belief such as religion or &dquo;public opinion,&dquo; objectivity in relation to scientific knowledge appears to mean, for the social scientist, accepting received scientific facts and theories as the truth. It can be argued that because science decides which side is correct, it does not compromise the social scientist's objectivity to become involved in support of the correct side. Indeed, the social researcher may be attracted to the controversy because of requests from participants or be drawn to it by a duty to support truth against misguided opponents. Martin Gardner's (1957) (1979, 238) , and the study of the social processes involved in these attempts to legitimate parapsychology also provides insights into the maintenance of the dominant scientific culture.
From the perspective of their relativist stance, Collins and Pinch argue that the &dquo;actual existence&dquo; of the paranormal phenomena is redundant and that their position on the existence of the phenomena is neutral (1979, 262 inquiry (1979, 263) .
Defending themselves against these charges, Collins and Pinch claim they are &dquo;professional sociologists&dquo; who are &dquo;disinterested in these questions&dquo; (1979, 263) . This defense is not accepted by the discourse analysts Mulkay, Potter, and Yearley, who sought to undermine the relativist analysis of parapsychology by Collins and Pinch by alleging that the latter were &dquo;in a disguised fashion, constructing their analysis from the point of view of (some) parapsychologists&dquo; (Mulkay, Potter, and Yearley 1983, 187) . That partisans on both sides of the controversy saw Collins and Pinch's analysis as favoring the parapsychologists' case is used by the discourse analysts to support their criticism (Mulkay, Potter, and Yearley 1983, 188 ). According to Mulkay, Potter, and (Martin 1989 Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal (1969, v) . These authors assume that fluoridation is &dquo;progressive&dquo; and &dquo;rational&dquo; and agonize over the political difficulty that many citizens oppose it (1969, Gamson (1961, 54) concludes that &dquo;those who believe that truth needs no advocate need only witness a few of the more heated fluoridation controversies.&dquo; Hastreiter (1983, 486) Mazur's (1973 Mazur's ( , 1981 The literature on medical controversies is dominated by the standard positivist assumption that even the most protracted and rancorous conflicts may be resolved by the application of the scientific method to medicine in the form of the rigorously designed and properly applied controlled clinical trial (Lasagna 1980; Doyle 1983 Pauling's (1970) (Freer 1986 (Yetiv 1986 ) and a contributing editor to Nutrition Forum, the leading popular journal devoted to the exposure of nutritional quackery. In his book, Yetiv's approach to the vitamin C controversy was the standard positivist one: that vitamin C has been tested in the two &dquo;carefully performed scientific studies&dquo; carried out by the Mayo Clinic and that &dquo;current evidence clearly suggests that vitamin C has no role in the treatment of cancer&dquo; (1986, There is no reason to expect that discourse analysts are exempt from this process. As argued by Doran (1989) , the discourse analysts are subject to the same problems of reflexivity and recursion as the strong program analysts they criticize. Discourse analysts certainly have not shown how they might avoid being captives of controversy.
Our third conclusion is that the intervention by the analyst perturbs the dispute. Among other problems, this may make it more difficult for the analyst or other researchers to obtain access to participants and documents.
It is possible, we suggest, for the analyst's &dquo;unwitting&dquo; intervention significantly to change the course of the controversy.
So, methodological imperatives to the contrary, the controversy analyst, wittingly or not, may become a partisan participant in the debate. The view, raised to a principle in relativist approaches to controversy analysis, that social researchers must be neutral or apolitical observers requires radical reassessment. The political role of the researcher must also be addressed in any full-blooded controversy analysis. Our position is that symmetrical analysis is an illusion: the methodological claim of neutral social analysis is a myth that can be no more sustained in actual practice than can the scientist's belief in a universal and efficacious scientific method. We think that an analytic insistence on the political role of the analyst cuts through the Gordian knot of the sterile reflexivity debate.
The irony of our analysis is that the guise of neutrality is one of the best ways to be an effective partisan. The positivist controversy analyst, employing a &dquo;sociology of error,&dquo; is an effective supporter of scientific orthodoxy through stigmatizing its critics; the relativist analyst, through ostensible symmetry, is an effective supporter of the critics of orthodoxy by giving them unusual credence. An active partisan who undertakes either form of analysis has less credibility than an apparently independent and neutral person. This is precisely why partisans on one side point to the analyst, as independent authority, as support for their cause, while those on the other side try to paint the analyst as not being independent.
Our analysis fits nicely into the framework of the &dquo;weak program of the sociology of scientific knowledge&dquo; as presented by Chubin and Restivo (1983) . The weak program does not distinguish between the controversy and the analyst: the social scientist is automatically part of the controversy. The implication is that the analyst is more than a detached observer: the analyst should be critically involved, in the role of citizen.
Although the weak program provides a theoretical solution to the problem of the disjunction between participants and analysts of controversies, it provides no practical solution to the dilemmas posed by the prospect of being a captive of controversy. The analyst may employ a positivist analysis, a strong program analysis, a weak program analysis, or whatever. But that is simply the analyst's self-description. The (other) controversy partisans are likely to ignore motivations and methods and try to enroll, discredit, or otherwise deal with the analyst as their interests dictate. The implications of this for the study of controversies remain to be fully assessed.
8. In their most recent account of the laetrile controversy, Markle and Petersen (1987) are less cautious in their dissection of the role of orthodoxy in the conflict. It remains to be seen how this more critical account is viewed by orthodoxy.
